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Comment
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL
PARENT" STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
BabyJessica spent last Monday morning visiting her pediatri-
cian and playing in the park with her parents. When they got
home, around noon, her dad started packing her 'toys, her
clothes and her Winnie the Pooh videos into the red van that had
been sitting in their driveway. At 2 o'clock, the toddler's small
world exploded. Jan and Roberta DeBoer tried through their
tears to explain that they still loved her, that none of this was her
fault. Then they shook with grief as the child was carried scream-
ing from the house and placed in the van to leave them forever.'
Although moving, the story of BabyJessica is not uncommon.2 Baby
Jessica's story represents one of the many cases in recent years involving a
1. Geoffrey Cowley et al., Who's Looking After the Interests of Children?2, NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 16, 1993, at 54. This scene signaled the end of a two year dispute
between the DeBoers, Jessica's potential adoptive parents, and the Schmidts, Jes-
sica's biological parents. A court had just held that while Jessica's best interests
were furthered by allowing her to remain with the DeBoer's, her interests were not
dispositive. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245-46 (Iowa 1992). For an in depth
discussion of In re B.G.C., see infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text. This case
can be contrasted with the recent decision in Twigg v. Mays, in which a Florida
court noted that it "seldom will be in the children's best interests to wrench them
away from their legal fathers and judicially dedare that they now must regard
strangers as their fathers." Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-0l, 1993 WL 330624
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (quoting Department of HRS v. Privette., 18 FLW S226
(Fla. Apr. 8, 1993)). Both cases raise issues regarding the rights of children and
the scope of "family." Cowley, supra. For a discussion of Tw'gg, see infra text ac-
companying notes 199-204.
2. SeeJonathon Sidener, Adults in Tug of War over Toddler; Dad Fights Adoption
by Ex-Lover's In-Law, Aiuz. REPur., Oct. 11, 1993, at Al; John Wilkens, Birth Dad
Loses Battle to Gain Son; Ruling Lets San Diego Family Retain Custody of Child, SAN
DIEGo UNION-TRIB., Oct. 19, 1993, at Al. A similar custody dispute arose in San
Diego, between prospective adoptive parents, John and Peggy Stenbeck, and bio-
logical parents, Mark King and Stephanie Harman, over a two-year old boy,
Michael. Wilkens, supra, at Al. Harman and King were unmarried when Michael
was conceived and gave him up for adoption. Id. The day after the birth, however,
King filed a petition for custody. Id.
Another similar case has arisen in Arizona between a prospective adoptive
mother, Cheryl, Weyermiller, and biological parents, Jeff Rhodes and Mary Pat
Tyler. Sidener, supra, at Al. Rhodes claims that Tyler only recently informed him
that he is the father of a nineteen-month old son. Id. As a result, the consent to
adoption may be invalid. Id.
(737)
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court's decision to remove a child from the custody of "psychological par-
ents" and return the child to biological parents.3 Courts have been strug-
gling for years with the termination of parental rights in situations where
the child is emotionally attached to a third party.4 While guidelines and
standards have been developed to deal with these situations, the issue re-
mains unresolved.5
The Baby Jessica case, In re B.G. C.,6 has received enormous press and
media coverage. 7 This attention stems in part from the widespread opin-
ion that the outcome was cruel and unjust to BabyJessica.8 The case has
prompted many commentators to question the judicial system's predomi-
3. Lynn Smith, Rallying Cry for Adoptive Parents' Rights; Families: A Grass-Roots
Committee Wants to Reform Adoption Laws to Avoid Another Baby Jessica Dispute. But
Some Say Birth Parents Could Lose Out, LA. TInEs, Oct. 20, 1993, at El [hereinafter
Smith, Adoptive Parents' Rights] (recognizing existence of hundreds of other such
custody cases). Through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality on a
continuing day-to-day basis, a psychological parent is one who fulfills not only the
child's physical needs, but also the child's psychological needs for a parent. In this
Comment, "parent" refers to either or both types of parents.
4. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 110, 119, 136-37 and accom-
panying text. The termination of parental rights involves the complete severance
of all legal bonds between the biological parent and child. Orman W. Ketcham &
Richard F. Babcock, Jr., Statutory Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 530, 531 (1976). "In the eyes of the law, a parent whose
rights have been terminated becomes a stranger to the child, with no right to cus-
tody, visitation, or communication." Id. For a list of jurisdictions that have ad-
dressed the issue of terminating parental rights in situations where the child is
emotionally attached to a third party, see infra notes 105, 114, 130.
5. For an analysis of the standards currently being applied in termination of
parental rights cases, see infra notes 104-61 and accompanying text.
6. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). B.G.C. represents the name "Baby Girl Clau-
sen." "Clausen" is the biological mother's maiden name. Id.
7. See Cowley, supra note 1 (noting possible consequences of, reasons for and
solutions to situations such as BabyJessica case); Steve Schmidt, 150 Rally for Kids'
Rights in Adoption Organizers Compelled by Baby Jessica Scene, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIn.,
Oct. 24, 1993, at B3 (noting rally galvanized by outcome of Baby Jessica case im-
plored officials to give greater consideration to best interests of children in adop-
tion cases); Smith, Adoptive Parents' Rights, supra note 3, at El (noting BabyJessica
case has become catalyst in pushing children's rights movement from "rhetoric to
action"); Lynn Smith, Which Side to Take in the Adoption Triangle?; A Birth Mother; 'It's
Never in the Best Interest of Children to be Bought, LA. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at El
[hereinafter Smith, Adoption Triangle] (discussing how BabyJessica case has illumi-
nated controversy in society over. what constitutes best interests of children);
Thomas Sowell, Baby Jessica's Happiness Was Sacrificed to America's Fetish For 'Rights,'
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 10, 1993, at A22 (reflecting frequent lack of compas-
sion for children in law). The BabyJessica case even spawned a TV movie called
"Whose Child Is This? The War for BabyJessica," which aired on September 27,
1993. Tom Shales, The DeBoers' War; Baby Jessica: An Emotional View of an Unfeeling
System, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 25, 1993, at B1.
8. See Smith, Adoptive Parents' Rights, supra note 3, at El (discussing national
organization advocating children's rights galvanized by custody case over Jessica
DeBoer).
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nant stance on the rights of children.9 In particular, the controversy has
sparked recognition of the problems with standards and guidelines cur-
rently applied by courts in deciding whether to terminate parental
rights. 10
Defining the nature of this problem remains difficult because termi-
nation decisions encompass so many issues. For example, any solution
must take into account the rights of parents, the rights of children and the
limitations on state intervention into family life.1 1 In order to properly
account for these factors, courts must necessarily determine their scope.1
2
Each factor alone, however, presents an independent issue subject to de-
bate. Thus, it is easy to understand why the particular standards and
guidelines courts employ in making termination decisions create tremen-
dous controversy.
Cases such as In re B. G. C. involve legal battles between biological par-
ents and psychological parents for the custody of minor children.' 3 Reso-
9. See Christy Harrison, Courts, Kids and Custody, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct.
10, 1993, at HI (noting national attention and heightened interest in children's
legal rights has yet to bring legislation giving greater legal protection to children);
W. Alton Parish, Biology's Role in Parenting Is Overbilled, DALLUAs MOANING NEWS, Oct.
10, 1993, at 6J (expressing view that biology has nothing to do With parenting);
Michael Rezendes, Nature vs. Nurture: The Parents' Debate; Publicized Rulings Stir
Questions on Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1993,'at 3 (discussing possible re-
forms that would force courts to give more weight to child's wishes); Sowell, supra
note 7, at A22 (disparaging "reckless mindlessness" of creating absolute rights for
biological parents without regard to effects on children).
In addition, a national organization called the DeBoer Committee for Chil-
dren's Rights is attempting to change laws so that the best interests of the child are
considered in every custody case. Smith, Adoptive Parents' Rights, supra note 3, at
El.
10. For a discussion of the standards currently being applied in termination
of parental rights cases, see infra notes 104-61 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of a proposed solution that takes all these rights into
account, see infra notes 162-87.
12. For an analysis of the evolution of the right of parents, see infra text ac-
companying notes 24-58. For an analysis of the current status of children's rights,
see infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
13. See S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1000 (Alaska 1982) (involving biological
mother who gave child up for adoption and thereafter changed mind); In re Doe,
627 N.E.2d 648 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (same), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il.), cert. denied
sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied sub nom. Doe v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (same); In reJ.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988)
(same); In re Samantha D., 740 P.2d 1168 (N.M. 1987) (same). These situations
also arise when a biological parent does not have the means or the desire to care
for the child and voluntarily hands the child over to a relative or close friend for
care. See In reJ.C.P., 307 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Woodruff v. Keale, 637 P.2d
760 (Haw. 1981); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 919 (1982); In reK.S.H., 442 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1989); Wade v. Geren, 743
P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1987); In re Grover, 681 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1984). This situation
creates a relationship called the "common-law adoptive parent-child relationship."
J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 27 (1973).
Custody disputes also arise when children in foster care become emotionally
attached to their foster family and vice versa. See Paul v. Steele, 461 N.E.2d 983 (111.
1994]
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lution of these cases depends largely on the weight a court accords to the
respective rights and interests of the parties involved. 14 The interests of
the biological parents and the psychological parents, however, are not the
only interests implicated. Courts and parties to the dispute often forget
that the child being fought over also has interests deserving protection. 15
In addition, the particular weight given to each of the interests remains
outside objective measurement because such determination rests within
the discretion of the court.1 6 For these two reasons, the outcome of termi-
nation cases across the country has produced inconsistency and uncer-
tainty in the law. 17
The dilemma in third-party custody disputes results from the fact that
children's rights are often neither recognized nor respected.18 First, this
Comment analyzes the evolution of the law with respect to both parental
rights and the rights of children. 19 Second, this Comment addresses the
status of the law with respect to the definition of "family" in light of the
psychological parent concept.20 Third, this Comment discusses the cur-
1984); In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122 (N.Y. 1992); In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
14. For a listing ofjurisdictions and the emphases they place on these respec-
tive interests, see infra notes 110, 118, 136-37 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the interests of the child, see infra notes 162-84 and
accompahying text.
16. See Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Be-
tween Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149, 154
(1980) (referring to limitless court discretion). Courts remain free to decide what
constitutes "unfitness" and the "best interests of the child" with little guidance. See
id.
17. For a discussion of the different outcomes in termination cases, see infra
notes 104-61 and accompanying text.
18. See Victor L. Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights, in
THE RiGHTs OF CHIDIREN 29, 29-30 (Harvard Educational Review, ser. no. 9, 1974).
Historically, rights in society have been ascribed only to adults. Chil-
dren have been treated paternally; their conduct has been controlled by
parents or others in authority. Such control has been justified, in the
paternalist view, by the need to protect children from themselves and
others. It is argued that children cannot be responsible for their own
welfare because by their nature they lack an adequate conception of their
own present and future interests. They are said to want instant gratifica-
tion and to be incapable of fully rational decisions.
Well-intentioned though this view may be, its implicit claim that
adults do have an adequate conception of children's interest, and that
they are always willing to act upon this conception, is open to serious
question. In fact, parents often do not know what is best for their chil-
dren, and children often can make sensible decisions for themselves
about their own lives. In addition, the parents, however wise, may have
interests and preferences which do not coincide with those of the child.
Id. (citations omitted).
19. For an analysis of the evolution of parental rights and the rights of chil-
dren, see infra text accompanying notes 24-72.
20. For a discussion of the liberty interest in the maintenance of a "family,"
see infra text accompanying notes 73-103.
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rent judicial standards that are applied and why they remain deficient.21
Fourth, this Comment proposes a solution and analyzes the proposed solu-
tion with respect to two recent controversial cases.2 2 Finally, this Com-
ment suggests that the proposed solution alone recognizes all of the
liberty interests at stake.2
3
II. ANALYsis
A. Development of Parental Rights and Rights of Children
At English common law, children were perceived as economic as-
sets. 24 A father had a legal right to the custody of his child.25 This princi-
ple emerged from the historical view of children as chattel.26 Even as
recently as eighteenth century America, "[c]hildren were regarded as
chattels of the family .... ,,27
This harsh view of children as property paved the way for the doctrine
of parens patriae.28 This doctrine was derived from the English Chancery
Courts' guardianship over infants, idiots and lunatics. 29 This guardian-
21. For the current standards being applied in termination of parental rights
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 104-61.
22. For a discussion of the proposed solution in light of several present con-
troversial cases, see infra notes 162-204 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion and analysis of the proposed solution, see infra text ac-
companying notes 205-06.
24. HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN 4 & n.6 (1974).
In 10th century England, a parent retained the power to kill an unweaned child or
sell a child under the age of seven into slavery. Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M.
Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party
Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY LJ. 209, 209 (1978). While murder of children was
prohibited by the 17th century, society still lacked power to intervene into the
parent-child relationship. Id. at 209-10. Parents were not even required to provide
their children with necessities. Id. at 210.
25. Gloria Christopherson, Development, Minnesota Adopts a Best Interests Stan-
dard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In reJ.J.B., 71 MINN. L. REv. 1263,
1266 (1987). Further, this custody right over the child could be contracted away
by the father. McGough & Shindell, supra note 24, at 210.
26. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wright, 62 P. 613, 614 (Cal. 1900) (noting father's
right to custody of child is property right); Kennedy v. Meara, 56 S.E. 243, 247 (Ga.
1906) (recognizing parent has property right in child, entitling parent to due pro-
cess protection); see also Lynn M. Akre, Struggling With Indeterminacy: A Call for Inter-
disciplinary Collaboration in Redefining the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 75
MARQ. L. REv. 628, 634 (1992) (discussing. historical development of child
custody).
27. Rachel M. Dufault, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal
Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REv. 211, 213 (1991).
28. Id. Parens patriae power grants courts the authority and duty to remove a
child from the custody of its parents where the child has suffered physical detri-
ment such as abuse or neglect. McGough & Shindell, supra note 24, at 211. For a
history of the doctrine of parens patriae, see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
29. Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 H-ARv. L. REv.
1156, 1221-22 (1980) [hereinafter Developments].
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ship was initially exercised to ensure that feudal duties were transferred to
the minor after the minor's parents died.30 It gradually evolved, however,
into an exercise of state power in private custody cases.31 This power al-
lowed state intervention into decisions traditionally made by the parent,
when the state determined it necessary for the child's welfare.32
American courts applied parens patriae power in both private and pub-
lic custody disputes.3 3 Traditionally, the power was invoked to protect
children from their parents in cases of abuse and neglect.34 Courts apply-
ing the doctrine in private custody disputes held that parental unfitness
was required before termination of parental rights could occur.3 5 The re-
quirement of unfitness, however, was based on the belief that the state's
interests were served because the biological parent best fostered the
child's welfare, rather than on the belief that a parent's right to their child
was absolute. 36
The power of parens patriae evolved as the Industrial Revolution
brought about a new awareness of children.3 7 Advances in nutrition,
30. Id. at 1222. When a knight died leaving minor children, the lord of the
manor was entitled to all the profits of the deceased knight's land while the chil-
dren remained minors. Custer, supra note 28, at 199. During their minority, these
children were referred to as "wards." Id. When the wards reached majority, how-
ever, the lord was required to transfer the land to them. Id.
31. Id. Initially, the English Chancery Courts only exercised the parens patriae
power on behalf of the state ward and not on behalf of others. Id. The Chancery
Court extended the power to exceptional private custody cases by the early 19th
century on the premise that all young children required the state's beneficent pro-
tection, not just the propertied wards. Id. These courts claimed equity jurisdiction
in protecting children from immoral and heretical parents. Id.
32. Akre, supra note 26, at 635.
33. Developments, supra note 29, at 1222. Private custody disputes involved the
equity courts' employment of parens patriae authority delegated by the legislatures.
Id. The opinions of 19th century American courts of equity indicate that parens
patriae power to terminate the legal custody rights of a natural parent was limited
to situations where: (1) the child was competent to choose between the parties to
the custody dispute; and (2) there was an affirmative showing of parental unfit-
ness. Id. at 1223.
Conversely, use of parens patriae authority in public custody disputes distorted
the power by expanding it to uphold statutes providing for state intervention into
the family. Id. at 1224. In this context, the power was used to uphold child neglect
and delinquency statutes. Id.
34. Id. at 1221.
35. Id. at 1223.
36. Id. An opinion by Judge Story written in 1824 clearly reflects this view.
As to the question of the right of the father to have the custody of his
infant child, in a general sense it is true. But this is not on account of any
absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the infant, the law
presuming it to be for his interest to be under the nurture and care of his
natural protector, both for maintenance and education.
Id. at 1223 n.160.
37. AlbertJ. Solnit, Child Rearing and Child Advocacy, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 723,
723-24 (1976). In medieval times, upon reaching the age of seven or eight, the
child left home to begin work in the fields or shops. Id. at 723. Thus, the Indus-
trial Revolution brought about dramatic changes in institutions, technology and
6
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disease prevention, and medicine extended the average life span of a
child.38 Consequently, the length of a child's relationship with the parent
increased and parenthood developed an intrinsic "psychological mean-
ing."39 Thus, the parent-child relationship evolved from a purely eco-
nomic relationship to an emotional relationship. Nevertheless, use of
parens patriae power has waned in recent decades.40 In its place, the no-
tion of the child as an individual, whose rights should be recognized
under the law, has emerged.4 1
Today, children are no longer perceived as parental property. Thus,
parents may not treat their children as such. Nevertheless, under the
United States Constitution, parental rights have been deemed more fun-
damental than property rights. 42 The United States Supreme Court has
consistently recognized parental rights to children under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43 Meyer v. Nebraska4 was the first explicit recognition of the
customs permitting children to stay at home and spend more time with parents.
Id. at 723-24.
38. Id. at 724. Previously, the majority of children rarely lived to adolescence
due to the proliferation of mysterious illnesses for which no cure existed. Id. at
723-24.
39. Id. at 724. Development of the "psychological parent-child relationship"
resulted from the prolonged duration of the parent-child relationship. Id. Be-
cause children lived longer, parents could attach themselves emotionally to their
children for sixteen to eighteen years instead of six to eight years. Id. The notion
of family thus changed and parents came to view their children as their "replace-
ments." Id. This view raised parents' hopes for imm ortality. Id. at 725. Accord-
ingly, parents foresaw their children fulfilling the aspirations that they remained
powerless to achieve. Id.
40. Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 4, at 534-35.
41. Id. at 535.
42. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (stating mother's parental rights are "far more precious" than
property rights); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 605,
616 (1976) (noting both English and American judges view origins of parental
rights as more fundamental than property rights).
43. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) (stating relationship of
love and duty in family unit is liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing fundamental liberty
interests of parents in care, custody and management of child); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (noting parental authority is consistent with notion of
individual liberty); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (stating parental right
and duty to prepare children for obligations); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978) (recognizing relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (recognizing right to raise child as essential); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976) (recognizing parental discretion is
protected); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (emphasizing importance
of rights to raise children and family); May, 345 U.S. at 533 (stating right to raise
children is far more precious than property right); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (noting right to raise children is basic civil right of man); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (suggesting right of parents to send children to
7
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parental right to custody and control. 45 In. Meyer, the Supreme Court
stated that parents have a right to "establish a home and bring up chil-
dren."46 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,47 decided only two years after Meyer, reaf-
firmed the parental right to "direct the upbringing and education of the
children under their control."48 In emphasizing parental rights over chil-
dren, the Court stated that those who raise the children have the rights
and duties to control the fates of those children. 49 In both Meyer and
Pierce, the Court classified the parental rights involved as "liberty"
interests.50
The Court further interpreted parental rights over children in Prince
v. Massachusetts.51 Prince involved a parent's right to give a child religious
training.52 The Prince Court held "[i]t is cardinal ...that the custody,
schools is essence of personal liberty and freedom); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) (holding right of individual to bring up children is liberty). The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o
state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
45. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child As Property, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 (1992). For a revisionist
history of the decisions in Meyer and Pierce, see Woodhouse, supra.
Meyer v. Nebraska involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a Nebraska
statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to children not yet in
eighth grade, in parochial or public schools. 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923). A teacher
was charged under the statute with unlawfully teaching a student the subject of
reading in the German language. Id. at 396. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
held the statute came within the state's police powers because its purpose ensured
that the English language become the "mother tongue" of all the children reared
in the state. Id. at 398. The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that
the liberty to bring up one's children "may not be interfered with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest." Id. at 400. The Nebraska statute was based on
the fear that "[t]o allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be
taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to...
educate them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a conse-
quence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best
interests of this country." Id. at 398. Quite clearly, the law was born of the anti-
German bias of the war years. Woodhouse, supra, at 1004. In fact, sixteen other
states besides Nebraska had similar language laws. Id.
46. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
47. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
48. Id. at 534-35. Pierce involved the challenge to a statute known as the Com-
pulsory Education Act. Id. at 530. The Act required all parents and/or guardians
to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public schools. Id. This
statute stemmed from "anti-Catholic and anti-foreign prejudice and the conviction
that private and parochial schools were breeding grounds of Bolshevism." Wood-
house, supra note 45, at 1018.
49. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
50. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding act in question unreasonably inter-
fered with liberty of parents to raise children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (stating lib-
erty may not be interfered with, under guise of protecting public interest).
51. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
52. Id. at 164. The appellant in Prince appealed from a conviction for violat-
ing Massachusetts' child labor laws proscribing children under the age of 18 from
744 [Vol. 39: p. 737
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care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."5
3
Perhaps the most zealous affirmation of parental rights was articu-
lated in Stanley v. Illinois.5 4 The Stanley Court further clarified the scope of
parental rights by holding that a parent has a constitutional right to a
hearing determining "fitness" before such a negative determination can
be made and before a child may be taken from the custody of a parent.55
In Parham v. JR,5 6 parental rights were further extended to allow a
parent to commit a minor child to a state mental hospital without a hear-
ing.57 While conceding that children have important interests at stake in
these situations, the Court, nevertheless, limited such rights by applying
selling any newspapers, magazines or other merchandise in the streets. Id. at 160-
61. Appellant was aJehovah's Witness and the legal custodian of her nine year old
niece. Id. at 161. As such, the nine year old was accustomed to preaching and
distributing certain pamphlets to persons on the streets. Id. at 161-62. On the
evening of her arrest, appellant allowed her niece to help her preach and dis-
tribute these materials after the girl had asked appellant if she "could go with her.
Id. at 162. When questioned by a school attendance officer, appellant admitted
she had supplied the girl with the materials and said, "neither you nor anybody
else can stop me .... This child is exercising her God-given right and her constitu-
tional right to preach the gospel, and no creature has a right to interfere with
God's commands." Id.
Appellant challenged the statute on two grounds-freedom of religion under
the First Amendment and parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 164. In deciding the case in favor of the appellant, the Court recognized the
right of children to exercise their religion and the right of parents to encourage
their children to practice religious beliefs. Id. at 165.
53. Id. at 166. The Court emphasized, however, that the rights to care and
custody may be limited in order to protect the child's well-being. Id.
54. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley involved a statute which provided that illegiti-
mate children became wards of the state upon the death of their mother. Id. at
646. The statute was premised on a determination that unwed fathers were pre-
sumptively unfit. Id. at 650. In analyzing the constitutionality of this presumption,
the Court reiterated the magnitude of the parent's interest in a child, and held the
law has never "refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimatized by a
marriage ceremony." Id. at 651.
55. Id. at 658.
56. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
57. See id. Parham involved a challenge to a Georgia statute that allowed a
parent to commit a child to a state mental hospital. Id. at 591. The requirements
included the parent or guardian's application and an observation by the superin-
tendent of the hospital to determine whether any evidence of mental illness ex-
isted. Id.
The appellees were two children who had been committed to a state mental
hospital by their respective parents. Id. at 589-90. They argued that a liberty inter-
est arose in not being unnecessarily admitted to a mental hospital and that this
interest outweighed the traditional rights of parents. Id. at 602. Nevertheless, the
Court respectively held the statute was constitutional and refused to subordinate
the rights of the parents to raise their child to the rights of the child. Id. at 602,
620. The Court, however, qualified this conclusion by stating that the child's
rights and the nature of the decision to commit combine to prevent parents from
exercising absolute and unreviewable discretion in such circumstances. Id. at 604.
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the presumption that parents generally act in the best interests of their
children.5 8
Although the scope of parental rights in decisions regarding the up-
bringing of children remains broad, parents do not have absolute rights.59
Children have also been accorded constitutional protection, although not
in an amount comparable to that accorded adults.60 The United States
Supreme Court first extended this protection to children through In re
Gault.6A The Gault Court explicitly held that the rights articulated in the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights equally apply to children as
well as adults.62 The Court, consequently, emphasized that minors are
entitled to the "essentials of due process and fair treatment."6 3 . The
Supreme Court has continued to broaden the scope of children's rights
with decisions upholding a minor's rights to free speech, privacy, protec-
tion against double jeopardy and a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 64
58. Id. at 602-04. "[H]istorically it has [been] recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." Id. at 602
(citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447 (Henry W. Ballantine ed., 1915)).
59. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 (stating parents do not have absolute and un-
reviewable discretion in deciding whether to institutionalize a child); Stanley, 405
U.S. at 652 (recognizing state's power to separate child from parent in cases of
neglect or abuse); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1943) ("Parents may
be free to become martyrs themselves[] (blut it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children .... ").
60. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("[TIhe constitutional rights
of children cannot be equated with those of adults."). Historically, however, chil-
dren have not been accorded the constitutional protection accorded to adults. See
Michele D. Sullivan, From Warren to Rehnquist: The Growing Conservative Trend in the
Supreme Court's Treatment of Children, 65 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 1139, 1139 (1991) (argu-
ing that children lack same degree of constitutional protection as adults). Not
until the early twentieth century did courts begin to recognize the rights of chil-
dren to be free from abuse or neglect. Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third
Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705,
706-07 (1986).
61. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The minor of In re Gault was arrested for making ob-
scene phone calls. Id. at 4. No notice of the charges or of the minor's right to
counsel was given to the minor's parents. Id. at 5. In addition, no sworn testimony
was taken by the complainant, nor did the complainant appear at the juvenile
hearing. Id. The Court held the minor was entitled to notice of the charges filed
against him, notice of his right to counsel, and the sworn testimony of the com-
plainant subject to cross-examination. Id. at 33-34, 41, 57.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (striking down
statute requiring parental consent before unmarried girl under 18 could obtain
abortion); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding juvenile cannot be
adjudicated twice for same offense); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970)
(requiring adult standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal proceedings
against juveniles); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969) (holding minors have right to wear arm bands in school to protest
Vietnam War).
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Later, the Supreme Court, in Bellotti v. Baird,6 5 reaffirmed a minor's
right to privacy. The Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute
requiring minors to obtain parental consent in order to have an abor-
tion.6 6 Nevertheless, although minors have now secured the right to de-
cide to have an abortion without parental consent, parental notification of
this decision may still be required.6 7
Over time, children have made significant advances in the fight for
recognition of their rights. Nonetheless, children still have not been af-
forded all the constitutional rights secured by adults.68 Some courts still
have not recognized that the child, as well as the parent, has an interest in
the parent-child relationship.69 Three notable justifications have been as-
serted for withholding the full rights of children., These reasons include:
first, "the peculiar vulnerability of children, [second,] their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner and [third,] the
importance of the parental role in child rearing."70 It is precisely for these
reasons, however, that children should be provided special protection.
In addition to the right to be free from physical abuse and neglect,
one such special protection that should be afforded to children includes
the right to psychological well-being. 7 1 The child's right to psychological
65. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
66. Id. at 651. The statute failed to pass constitutional muster for two reasons.
First, the legislation arbitrarily denied a mature and fully competent minor the
ability to decide to terminate her pregnancy. Id. Second, the statute required
parental notification without allowing a minor a judicial determination as to her
maturity in making the abortion decision alone, or alternatively, as to whether an
abortion was in her best interest. Id.
67. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). The Matheson Court upheld a
statute requiring minors to notify parents before they could obtain an abortion.
Id. at 409-10. This case signaled the reluctance of the Court to further expand
children's rights. See id. at 410 (observing society's basic structure recognizes pa-
rental right to raise child in deciding that parental notice requirement does not
violate rights of minor).
68. See Ware v. Estes, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (declining to review lower court
decision upholding school system's right to use corporal punishment); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality) (denying minor's right to jury trial in
juvenile court); FOSTER, supra note 24, at 3 ("Legal processes and doctrines which
are applied to children do not always square with the egalitarian principles and
constitutional protection accorded to adult criminals even though the former may
have had a greater need for protection."); Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and
the Minimization of Children's Constitutional Rights: Implications for the Juvenile Justice
System, 13 HtAmINJ. PuB. L. & POL'Y 199 (1992); see also Hillary Rodham, Children
Under the Law, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1 (Harvard Educational Review, ser. no.
9, 1974) (advocating extension of adult rights to children and seeking legal recog-
nition of children's special needs and interests).
69. For a discussion of the Michigan Supreme Court's rejection of the argu-
ment that children too have a liberty interest in preserving their family, see infra
note 197.
70. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
71. See GOLDSrEn, supra note 13 (advocating use of psychological parent stan-
dard in child custody cases). Children have a moral right and should have a legal
right: (1) to be regarded as persons within the family, at school and before the
11
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well-being, however, currently remains unrecognized as a significant inter-
est of the child deserving protection in custody disputes.72
B. "Family" Is Not Based Solely on Biology
Recent judicial decisions have discussed the implications of custody
disputes between biological parents and "psychological parents."73 A psy-
chological parent fulfills not only the child's physical needs, but also the
child's psychological needs through continuing interaction, companion-
ship, interplay and emotional mutuality on a day-to-day basis.74 Psycholog-
ical parent-child relationships can occur when a child is placed in foster
care or in the home of a relative or a close friend "temporarily" by a bio-
logical parent, or when a child is awaiting a final decree of adoption while
living with potential adoptive parents. 75 A psychological parent can be
either a biological parent or any other caring adult.76 An absent or inat-
law; (2) to receive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to
grow to maturity in home environments that enable them to develop into mature
and responsible adults; (3) to be supported, maintained and educated to the best
of parental ability, in return for which they have the moral duty to honor their
mothers and fathers; (4) to receive fair treatment from all in authority and to be
heard and listened to; (5) to earn and keep their own earnings, and to be emanci-
pated from the parent-child relationship when that relationship has broken down
and they have left home due to abuse, neglect, serious family conflict or other
sufficient cause, and when their best interests would be served by termination of
parental authority;, (6) to be free of legal disabilities or incapacities save where
such are convincingly shown to be necessary and protective of their actual best
interests; (7) to seek and obtain medical care, treatment and counseling; and (8)
to receive special care, consideration and protection in the administration of law
and justice so that their best interests always are a paramount factor. FOSTER, supra
note 24, at xv.
72. For a discussion of the protection given a child's right to psychological
well-being in custody disputes, see infra notes 104-61 and accompanying text.
73. See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240-41 (1992) (involving dispute be-
tween biological parents and potential adoptive parents). For an analysis of In re
B.G.C., see infra text accompanying notes 188-98. See also In re Anthony D., 1993
WL 393348, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 30, 1993) (involving custody dispute
between biological parent and foster parents); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01,
1993 WL 330624, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (involving custody dispute
between biological parents and man who raised child since birth); Monroe v.
Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 906-07 & n.9 (Md. 1993) (involving custody dispute be-
tween biological mother and man who originally was believed to be biological fa-
ther, but was not); Doe v. Mitchell, 244 N.W.2d 827, 843 (Mich. 1976)
(recognizing that psychological parent-child relationship may be more important
than biological parent-child relationship), overruled by Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d
568 (Mich. 1992); Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 401 (N.D. 1987) (Levine,
J., concurring and dissenting) (recognizing importance of bonding that exists be-
tween children and psychological parents); In re Stell, 783 P.2d 615, 620 (Wash. Ct.
A pp. 1989) (declining to reject psychological parent theory); Snyder v. Scheerer,
436 S.E.2d 299, 301 (W. Va. 1993) (recognizing that nonparent with whom child
resides for long time becomes psychological parent).
74. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 98.
75. Id. at 22, 23, 27.
76. Id. at 19.
[Vol. 39: p. 737
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tentive adult may not be a psychological parent, however, even if the adult
is a biological parent. 77
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the rights
of the parties in custody disputes between biological parents and psycho-
logical parents. 78 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that constitu-
tional rights are not accorded to parents merely because of the biological
factor, but because of the emotional relationship between the child and
the adult.79
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Refom 0 con-
cerned a class action by foster parents challenging the constitutionality of
procedures for removing foster children from foster homes. 81 In its analy-
sis, the Court acknowledged that the existence.of a family is not necessarily
dependent upon biological relationships.82 Further, the Court main-
tained that the significance of the family "stems from the emotional at-
tachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of chil-
dren," in addition to the blood relationship.8 3 This language fully com-
ports with the concept of "psychological relationships."8 4
The significance of biological relationships has also arisen in the con-
text of the rights of unwed fathers.8 5 In Quilloin v. Walcott,8 6 the Court was
77. Id.
78. See In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd 638 N.E. 2d
(Ill.), cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied
sub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); (Tully, PJ., dissenting) (citing
Carey v. Population Service International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), for proposition
that although Supreme Court has not directly addressed third-party custody dis-
putes, Court has extended right of privacy to include contraception, because all
persons, married or unmarried, maintain "a fundamental right to bear and beget a
child"); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (according great deference to
parent-child relationship)..
79. For an analysis of how the emotional relationship between parents and
children affects the constitutional rights of parents, see infra text accompanying
notes 80-103.
80. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
81. Id. at 818-20. The action in Smith arose when children were removed
from their foster families without a hearing on the removal. Id. The appellee
foster parents in Smith contended that when a child lives in a foster home for over
a year, psychological ties develop between children and foster parents creating a
"psychological family." Id. at 839. As a "family," appellees argued they had a lib-
erty interest in protecting that family. Id. Thus, appellees suggested that a foster
child cannot be removed from the family unless due process is satisfied. Id. The
Court held that even if the foster families had a liberty interest in the survival of
the family, the procedures satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process.
Id. at 856.
82. Id. at 843.
83. Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
84. For the definition of a psychological parent, see supra text accompanying
notes 74-77.
85. For an analysis of the issue of biological relationships in the context of
unwed father cases, see infra text accompanying notes 86-101.
1994]
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confronted with an issue similar to that raised in Stanley.87 QuiUoin in-
volved an unwed father who sought to contest the adoption of his biologi-
cal child. 88 In holding in favor of the adoptive father, the Court refused
to provide the unwed father with the traditional constitutional protection
given to biological parents on the ground that he had never had nor
sought actual or legal custody of his child.89 Moreover, the Court did so
without an adjudication as to "unfitness."90 The Court stated the adoption
would "give full recognition to a family unit already in existence."9 1 Quil-
loin indicates that the Court does not intend to accord biological parents
absolute rights to their biological children.92 The explicit recognition by
the Quilloin Court of existing families may pertain to situations in which
the child has formed a psychological parent-child relationship other than
with biological parents.
In Lehr v. Robertson,93 the Court was again faced with determining the
rights of an unwed father. The Court recognized that the liberty interest
86. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
87. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a discussion of Stanley, see
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
88. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. The mother of the child and appellant never
married or established a home with each other. Id. Three years after the birth of
the child, the mother remarried. Id. She consented to the adoption of the child
by her new husband. Id. Over appellant's objections, the trial court granted the
adoption absent a finding of unfitness. Id.
89. Id. at 255.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 255 ("[T]he result of the adoption in this case is to give full
recognition to a family unit already in existence .... ")
93. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). Appellant was the father of a child born on Novem-
ber 9, 1976. Id. at 250. Appellant and the mother of the child did not marry. Id.
at 249. The mother, however, married another man eight months after the birth
of the child. Id. at 250. When the child was approximately two years old, the
mother and her husband filed a petition to adopt the child in the Family Court of
Ulster County, New York. Id. Thereafter, the Ulster County Court entered an or-
der of adoption. Id. Prior to the adoption order, appellant had neither visited nor
provided financial support for the child. Id. at 252.
Appellant, however, claimed that the adoption was invalid under the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because he was
given neither advance notice of the adoption, nor an opportunity to be heard
before the adoption was granted. Id. The Court noted that under New York law,
before entering an adoption order for children born out of wedlock, notice must
be given to several classes of possible fathers of those children. Id. at 251. Notice
must be given to fathers registered in New York's "putative father registry," identi-
fied as: the father of the child on the child's birth certificate, the man living
openly with the child and the child's mother and holding themselves out to be the
father of the child, the man named the father by the mother in a sworn statement
and married to the mother before the child was six months old. Id. at 250-51.
Appellant did not fall into any of the above classes. Id. at 251-52. Appellant con-
tended, however, that he was still entitled to notice and a hearing because he had
filed a petition for visitation and paternity in the Westchester County Family Court,
of which the Ulster County Court judge had knowledge, before appellant had
knowledge of the adoption proceeding. Id. at 252-53. Appellant claimed he was
750 [Vol. 39: p. 737
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at stake in cases involving the constitutional rights of biological parents
consists of the "relationship of love and duty in a recognized family
unit."9 4 This interpretation of "liberty interest" compelled the Court to
decline constitutional protection to a biological father who had never sup-
ported and rarely seen his daughter since birth.95 Significantly, the Court
held that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection."96 In its analysis, the Court empha-
sized that family results from emotional attachments and not necessarily
from blood relations.9 7
Both the Quilloin and Lehr Courts decided custody in favor of the po-
tential adoptive father over the biological father. This trend signifies that
the argument supporting recognition of a child's right to a psychological
parent-child relationship merits consideration. 98 Further, Stanley is not in-
consistent with this proposition as the father's interests in Stanley were
weighed against those of the state, and not those of a third party claiming
a psychological parent-child relationship.9 In fact, the Stanley decision
can be readily reconciled with the Supreme Court's recognition of a
child's right to a psychological parent-child relationship. In Stanley, the
Court found in favor of a father who already enjoyed a psychological par-
ent-child relationship with his children.10 0 Thus, a liberty interest in "fa-
milial" bonds, including those between children and psychological
parents, exists and deserves legal recognition. 10 '
entitled to due process on the grounds that a putative father's actual or potential
relationship with his child constitutes a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 255.
94. Id. at 258.
95. Id. at 261.
96. Id.
97. Id. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way
of life' through the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood
relationship." Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231-33 (1972))).
98. For a discussion of the Quiloin and Lehr decisions, see supra notes 86-97
and accompanying text.
99. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a discussion of Stanley, see
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
100. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 666 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("[Stanley] ... loved,
cared for, and supported these children from the time of their birth until the
death of their mother.")
101. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (recognizing liberty interest in family relation-
ships stems from emotional attachments and not necessarily genetic bonds); Quil-
loin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1977) (recognizing liberty interest in
maintaining family unit where father of family was not biological father, but rather
psychological father); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974) ("[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
1994]
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Although an analysis of the foregoing decisions suggests that "family"
is not based solely on biology, nonetheless, the standards currently applied
by courts in deciding to terminate parental rights do not reflect this con-
clusion.10 2 Hence, the failure to incorporate the correct notion of "fam-
ily" into current judicial standards contributes to the seeming injustice of
decisions in termination proceedings. 103
C. Current Standards Employed in Termination of Parental Rights Cases
The legal standard courts apply in parental termination cases range
from the strict "parental rights" standard at one extreme to the "best inter-
ests of the child" standard at the other. 104 Although courts often claim to
utilize one standard or the other, most courts actually employ a balancing
test.'0 5 Because no two courts apply exactly the same standard, inconsis-
tency and uncertainty in the law linger. 10 6 Consequently, parents involved
in custody disputes lack adequate guidance in decision-making.
1. The "Parental Rights" Standard
The parental rights standard focuses on the "inherent and retained
rights involved in family relationships." 10 7 This standard is derived from
102. For an analysis of the various standards currently being applied in termi-
nation of parental rights cases, see infra notes 104-61 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992) (holding child
who lived for two and one half years with potential adoptive parents must be re-
turned to biological parents on grounds that biological parents had constitutional
right to raise child). For a discussion of the B.G.C. case, see infra notes 188-98 and
accompanying text.
104. For a description of the standards employed by various jurisdictions, see
infra notes 106-61 and accompanying text.
105. See In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 485 (Colo. 1985) (noting problems of
focusing solely on parental fault standard and recognizing modern trend to con-
sider termination of parental rights in context of best interests of child standard);
In re M.B., 386 N.W.2d 877, 883 (Neb. 1986) (stating standard is combination of
best interests of child and fault or neglect of parent); In re Kristopher B., 486 A.2d
277, 282 (N.H. 1984) (holding termination of parental relationship necessitates
balancing of fundamental rights as parent against child's best interests); In re
Higby, 611 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (adopting view that elements of
parental unfitness combine with best interests test while best interests of child
weighs in any consideration of parental fitness); State ex rel West Va. Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d 181, 188 (W. Va. 1987) ("Insistence upon
strict compliance with the statutory criteria before termination of parental rights
and subsequent adoption proceedings can occur is not inconsistent with concern
for the best interests of the child."); In reJL, 761 P.2d 985, 989 (Wyo. 1988) (assert-
ing rights of parents are implicit consideration along with best interests of child).
In an effort to maintain consistency, the classifications in this Comment re-
flect the most recent or most cited decisions from the highest courts in each state.
106. This conclusion reflects the author's opinion after thoroughly research-
ing the standards applied by courts in almost every state.
107. In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1982). The parental rights standard
resumes that parents act in the best interests of their children. See In re Angelia
., 623 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1981) (noting parental rights doctrine assumes biologi-
cal parents best fulfill child's needs); In re Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn.
16
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the common law notion that the custody of a child constitutes an exclusive
right of the father.10 8 The parental right standard is further supported by
cases such as Stanley in which the Court held that "the private interest...
of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." 109
As in Stanley, other courts utilizing the parental rights standard rarely ad-
dress the interests of the child.' 10
To sever the rights of natural parents under the parental rights stan-
dard, the party arguing for termination must prove the biological parent is
unfit."' The definition of "unfitness" varies from state to state. 112 Re-
1980) (noting burden of proof in termination of parental rights subject to assump-
tion that natural parents serve child's best interests); Brito v. Brito, 794 P.2d 1205,
1208 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing parental rights doctrine creates presump-
tion that child's best interests are served with child in custody of natural parents);
In re Grover, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) ("[T] he preference accorded by law to
the natural parent to the custody of his or her child determines that the best inter-
ests of the child will be served by awarding custody to the natural parent."); Alterna-
tives to "Parental Rights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE LJ.
151, 155 (1963) [hereinafter Alternatives] ("[T] he parental right doctrine is some-
times justified today through the assumption that a natural parent will most ade-
quately fulfill his [or her] child's needs.").
108. Christopherson, supra note 25, at 1270. For the history of the paternal
right to custody, see Henry H. Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the
Child?, 22 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 2 (1972).
109. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
110. See S.O. v. W.S., 643 P.2d 997, 1006 (Alaska 1982) (stating appropriate
inquiry in decision to terminate parental rights in favor of nonparent is natural
parent's fitness); Roche v. Roche, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (Cal. 1944) ("[Parental]
right can only be forfeited by a parent upon proof that the parent is unfit to have
such care and custody."); In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 488 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding absent finding of unfitness, right of natural parent is para-
mount); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982) ("[W]here a
third party sues the custodial parent to obtain custody of a child and to terminate
the parent's custodial rights in the child .... the parent is entitled to custody of the
child unless the third party shows by 'clear and convincing evidence' that the par-
ent is unfit."); Paul v. Steele, 461 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ill. 1984) ("The parental rights
of a nonconsenting parent may be terminated only upon an adjudication of unfit-
ness."); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1127 (Kan. 1981) ("It is clear under
our decisions.., that a natural parent's right to the custody of his or her children
is a fundamental right which may not be disturbed by the state or by third persons,
absent a showing that the natural parent is unfit."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919
(1982); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Okla. 1987) ("[A]bsent a showing of
unfitness the . . .natural parent would be entitled to custody as against anyone
else."); In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982) (noting that child's welfare is
paramount consideration but not sole consideration, and that state only has parens
patriae authority to assume parental role if natural parent is shown unfit or dysfunc-
tional); In re HJ.P., 789 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1990) (stating that court must find
unfitness to sever parental rights).
111. See S.O., 643 P.2d at 1006 (recognizing parent must receive custody in
custody dispute between parent and nonparent unless parent has been proven
unfit); Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d at 825 (holding that unfitness must be proven to ter-
minate custody); Pau4 461 N.E.2d at 985 (holding parental rights can be termi-
nated only if court determines natural parent is unfit); Sheppard, 630 P.2d at 1121
(striking down statute that allowed third party to take custody of minor child even
1994]
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gardless of its varying definition, however, unfitness must always be
demonstrated by "clear and convincing" evidence. 113 Although courts em-
ploying the parental rights standard do not determine terminations based
on the "best interests of the child," the preference inherently accorded to
parental rights is generally perceived as promoting the "best interests of
the child."'
14
when natural parent remains fit); Wade, 743 P.2d at 1075 (stating that natural par-
ent entitled to custody of child over all others absent showing of unfitness); In re
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377 ("[A] mother is entitled to a showing of unfitness, abandon-
ment, or substantial neglect before her parental rights are terminated.").
112. Recognizing the variety of interpretations of "unfit," the Kansas Supreme
Court defined the word as follows:
There is no statutory definition for the word "unfit." It therefore
must be given its ordinary significance, having due regard to the context.
In general, the word means unsuitable, incompetent, or not adapted for
a particular use or service. As applied to the relation of rational parents
to their child, the word usually although not necessarily imports some-
thing of moral delinquency. Parents who treat the child with cruelty or
inhumanity, or keep the child in vicious or disreputable surroundings,
are said to be unfit. Parents who abandon the child, or neglect or refuse,
when able so to do, to provide proper or necessary support and educa-
tion required by law, or other care necessary for the child's well being are
said to be unfit. Violence of temper or inability or indisposition to con-
trol unparental traits of character or conduct, might constitute unfitness.
So, also, incapacity to appreciate and perform the obligations resting
upon parents might render them unfit, apart from other moral defects.
Sheppard, 630 P.2d at 1127-28 (citing In re Vallimont, 321 P.2d 190 (Kan. 1958)).
. 113. SeeSantoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Petitioners in Santosky were
the natural parents of three children. Id. at 751. In 1973, the Family Court sought
to terminate the parental rights of the petitioners after incidents reflecting paren-
tal neglect. Id. At the time, the standard for finding "neglect" was a "fair prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard. Id. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality
of the standard. Id. The Family Court rejected the challenge and weighed the
evidence under the fair preponderance of the evidence standard and terminated
the petitioner's parental rights. Id.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court emphasized that natural parents retain a
fundamental liberty interest in the upbringing of their children. Id. at 753. In
light of this interest, the Court held that the "fair preponderance of the evidence"
standard violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
756. The standard failed to reflect an adequate level of certainty for a situation in
which a significant deprivation of liberty is threatened. Id. Therefore, the Court
mandated that the minimum standard of "clear and convincing" evidence is neces-
sary in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Marriage of
Matzen, 600 So. 2d at 488 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to show natural
father is unfit); Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d at 825 (requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence to show that parent is unfit or otherwise not entitled to custody); Pau4 461
N.E.2d at 987 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to forfeit parental right to
raise child).
114. See S.O., 643 P.2d at 1004 (requiring consideration of unfitness, aban-
donment and welfare of child in custody disputes between parents and
nonparents); In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So. 2d at 488 (considering unfitness or
whether custody with natural parent will be detrimental to welfare of child); Shep-
pard, 630 P.2d at 1124-25 ("[T]he policy of the state proceeds on the theory that
their [children's] welfare can best be attained by leaving them in the custody of
their parents and seeing to it that the parents' right thereto is not infringed
[Vol. 39: p. 737
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Courts that apply the strict parental fitness standard oppose any con-
sideration of the child's psychological well-being. 115 These courts sever
biological relationships in favor of psychological parent-child relationships
only where the biological parent has "abandoned" the child.1 16
This analysis remains faulty, not because courts require a finding of
abandonment, but rather in how courts define abandonment. Courts
should consider the child's psychological well-being in determining
whether the parent has abandoned the child.1 1 7 Such determinations
should be based "not on the intention of the adult, but rather on the
impact such a leave taking has on the child."118
upon."); In re Grover, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) ("[T]he preference accorded
by law to the natural parent to the custody of his or her child determines that the
best interests of the child will be served by awarding custody to the natural par-
ent."); In rejP., 648 P.2d at 1377 (discussing principle that child's welfare is "para-
mount consideration" not incompatible with "parental fitness" standard).
115. For a list of cases disregarding any consideration of the child's psycho-
logical well-being, see supra note 114.
116. For a list of cases illustrating this proposition, see supra note 110. Gener-
ally, courts applying the parental rights standard recognize the psychological well-
being of the child only in their assumption that the child is psychologically better
off in the custody of its natural parents. This assumption contains a flaw, however,
because even though the biological parent has an advantage and perhaps a greater
potential for establishing a psychological relationship with his or her child, no
such advantage exists after the child has been in the custody of and formed a
psychological relationship with a third party. Id.; cf Alternatives, supra note 107,
161-62 ("Both the parental rights doctrine and the procedural devices favoring
the natural parent are defensible in these terms only by an intuitive but incom-
plete psychological generalization-that a 'blood tie' between parent and child
will eventually result in more and better love and, hence, in a more adequate psy-
chological development of that child.").
117. GoLDSMIN, supra note 13, at 78.
118. Id. When the focus is on the child's psychological well-being rather than
on the adult, both the requisite finding of abandonment and the best interests of
the child are being taken into account. Some courts have recognized that a child's
psychological well-being can be taken into account. Ketcham & Babcock, supra
note 4, at 537; see, e.g., In reJennifer "S", 330 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1972), which states:
Too often a preoccupation with parental rights tends to blur the es-
sential right of an infant to end the limbo of foster care (or shelter board-
ing care) and secure a permanent parental home either with his natural
or adoptive parents. Parental "rights" must not be emphasized to the
point of denying the child a parental "home." The courts have tended to
evade or avoid the superior right of an infant to the protection of a per-
manent home as the most essential element of its emotional well being,
by repeated assertions that the best interests of an infant always rest with
the blood-related parent, unless the parent is unfit, or has surrendered
the child irrevocably for adoption, or has "abandoned" the child inten-
tionally. This may be so, if the concept of abandonment be construed by
the courts liberally enough so that the constitutional rights of the infants,
rarely asserted, are not derogated or infringed. That the courts have
sometimes harkened sufficiently to infants' constitutional rights, is illus-
trated not only by the parental unfitness doctrine, but also by the strong
probative weight given to older infants' expressed desire for a home
1994]
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2. Jurisdictional/Dispositional Standard
Unlike the strict parental fitness standard, the jurisdictional/disposi-
tional standard takes into consideration both the rights of the parents to
raise the child and the "best interests of the child."1 19 Courts using this
other than the parental home, if such other home is suitable and
reasonable.
In reJennifer, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
A New Mexico state statute has explicitly defined "abandonment" to include
an aspect of the psychological well-being of children. See In re Samantha D., 740
P.2d 1168, 1171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). In interpreting the statute in a case involv-
ing the termination of the parental rights of the biological mother, the New Mex-
ico Court of Appeals stated:
We cannot agree with appellant that Section 32-1-54 is vague or am-
biguous. Section 32-1-54(C) provides that in order for a rebuttable pre-
sumption of abandonment to be created, all of the conditions of Section
32-1-54(B) (4) must exist:
B. The court shall determine parental rights with respect to a mi-
nor child when:
(4) the child has been placed in the care of others .... either by a
court order or otherwise and the following conditions exist:
(a) the child has lived in the home of others for an extended period
of time;
(b) the parent-child relationship has disintegrated;
(c) a psychological parent-child relationship has developed between
the substitute family and the child;
(d) if the court deems the child of sufficient capacity to express a
preference, the child prefers no longer to live with the natural parent;
and
(e) the substitute family desires to adopt the child.
Id. (citations omitted). Based on its analysis of the statute, the court found that
"abandonment" must be determined from the viewpoint of the child and not the
parent. Id.
119. There are currently fifteen states that apply the jurisdictional/disposi-
tional standard. See In reJuv. Action No. JS-500274, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (Ariz. 1990)
("[B] est interests of the child are a necessary, but not exclusively sufficient, condi-
tion for an order of termination."); In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1, 10 (Conn. 1992)
(requiring strict compliance with statutory criteria before consideration of child's
best interests); Black v. Gray, 540 A.2d 431, 434 (Del. 1988) (holding best interests
of child must be determined after statutory requirements for termination have
been met); Woodruff v. Keale, 637 P.2d 760, 768-69 (Haw. 1981) (noting termina-
tion of parental rights in Hawaii takes parents' rights into account before consider-
ing best interests of child); In reAragon, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (Idaho 1991) ("[O]nce
a statutory ground for termination is found, the magistrate must determine what is
in the best interest of the child."); In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986)
(noting even if all grounds for termination are found, termination must still be in
best interest of child); Petit v. Holifield, 443 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1984) (provid-
ing once abandonment, desertion or unfitness is established, best interests of child
may be considered); In re B.H.M., 799 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1990) (noting best
interests test is proper after initial finding of dependency, abuse or neglect);
Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nev., 691 P.2d 849, 854 (Nev. 1984) (requiring both
jurisdictional grounds and dispositional grounds for termination); In re Baby M.,
537 A.2d 1227, 1242 (N.J. 1988) (stating substantial harm to child must be shown
before termination despite best interests language); In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d
246, 250-51 (N.C. 1984) (prohibiting termination of parental rights where statu-
tory grounds are present if not in child's best interest); In re Beasley, 840 P.2d 78,
756 [Vol. 39: p. 737
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standard determine whether to terminate parental rights based on a two-
step analysis. In Champagne v. Welfare Division of Nevada State Department,120
the Nevada Supreme Court set forth a clear explanation of this standard.
First, a court must find 'jurisdictional" grounds for a termination of paren-
tal rights.12 1 The Champagne court held that jurisdictional grounds exist
when the biological parent forfeits rights related to the child. l2 2 If
deemed "unsuitable," a parent forfeits all rights in the child.123 A parent
may be rendered unsuitable if he or she neglects the child, abandons the
child, becomes unfit or fails to make an effort to remedy the situation that
initially caused the child to be taken from the biological parent. 12 4 Other
courts applying this standard base their findings ofjurisdictional grounds
on respective state statutes for involuntary termination of parental
rights.125 Although abandonment, unfitness and neglect are grounds for
termination in the majority of states, many other grounds exist on which
courts can rely.
126
83 (Or. 1992) (requiring satisfaction of both statutory grounds and child's best
interest test to terminate parental rights); In re Coast, 561 A.2d 762, 770 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (stating child's best interest is considered only after parent's inca-
pacity is proven by clear and convincing evidence), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 560 (Pa.
1990); In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989) (" [T]he primary step before
any termination of parental rights is that there be a finding of parental unfitness.
Once this fact is established, the best interests of the child outweigh all other con-
siderations."); In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tenn. 1988) (stating parental
rights severed only by clear and convincing evidence that it is in child's best inter-
est); In re C.E.W., 368 N.W.2d 47, 54 (Wis. 1985) (limiting best interests standard
to dispositional stage of proceeding).
120. 691 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1984). Champagne involved the consolidation of four
cases in which appeals were brought by parents challenging the state's termination
of their parental rights. Id. at 849.
121. Id. at 854.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 855.
124. Id.
125. For a list of courts that apply the jurisdictional/dispositional standard,
see supra note 119.
126. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-2005(d) (Supp. 1993). The Idaho statute pro-
vides that an order granting termination of parental rights is also appropriate
where the "parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of
mental illness or mental deficiency, and there are reasonable grounds to believe
the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be inju-
rious to the health, morals or well-being of the child." Id. Under this statute, each
of the grounds for termination is independent. See id.
For other statutes that list a variety of jurisdictional grounds, see Amiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B) (1989) (abandonment, neglect or willful abuse, mental defi-
ciency of parent, unfitness resulting from conviction of felony); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17a-112(b) (1)-(4) (West 1992) (abandonment, neglect or child denied
care, guidance or control necessary for physical, education, moral or emotional
well-being); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(1),(3),(5) (1981) (abandonment,
parents found mentally incompetent, or parents failed to plan adequately for
child's physical, mental and emotional needs); IowA CODE § 232.116(1)(b)-(l)
(1985) (abandonment, desertion, child adjudicated in need of assistance); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(3) (Supp. 1993) (abandonment, abuse, failure of parent to
1994]
21
Warzynski: Termination of Parental Rights: The Psychological Parent Standard
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: p. 737
After determining the existence of jurisdictional grounds to termi-
nate parental rights, the court must then ascertain whether "dispositicinal"
grounds to terminate parental rights exist. 127 Dispositional grounds are
found if the court determines severance of parental rights of the biologi-
cal parent is in the best interests of the child. 128 The court may consider
the child's interests only if it reaches this second step. 129 Even if it con-
cludes a parent is unfit, the court is not required to terminate parental
rights.' 3 0 While courts have some discretion to weigh the child's interests,
both jurisdictional and dispositional grounds must be found before the
court terminates parental rights under this standard.' 3'
Courts employing ajurisdictional/dispositional standard subordinate
the child's rights and needs to the biological parents' rights. This stan-
dard does not consider the psychological well-being of the child unless the
child is adjudged to be abused, abandoned, neglected or some other statu-
tory ground for termination is satisfied.' 3 2 This standard is deficient in
that it considers only the child's right to physical well-being, and not the
child's right to psychological well-being.
adjust, extreme or deep-seated antipathy by child toward parent, parental defi-
ciency, or parent convicted of certain offenses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
609(1) (b),(c) (1993) (abandonment or child adjudicated youth in need of care);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 128.105(1)-(6) (1993) (abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure
of parental adjustment, risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury to the
child if returned to, or remains in, the home of parent, only token efforts by par-
ent to support or communicate with child, prevent neglect, avoid being unfit par-
ent, or eliminate risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury to child); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(2)-(4), (7),(8) (1989) (abuse or neglect, child willfully left
in foster care for more than twelve months, parental failure to pay portion of cost
of care for child in foster home, mental retardation of parent, or willful abandon-
ment); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511 (a)(1)-(5) (1991) (failure to perform paren-
tal duties, incapacity, abuse, neglect, parent presumptive, but not natural father of
child, abandonment, or child removed from care of parent for at least six
months); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(1)(a)-(d) (1988) (neglect, unfitness, child in
care of governmental child-placement agency for at least six consecutive months,
abandonment); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.120(1) (West Supp. 1994) (failure
to perform parental duties under circumstances showing substantial lack of regard
for parental obligations and best interests of child); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48-415
(West 1987) (abandonment, continuing need of protection or services, continuing
parental disability, continuing denial of visitation rights, child abuse and failure to
assume parental responsibility). For a detailed chart of the fifty states and their
grounds for termination as of 1980, see Mary S. Coleman, Standards for Termination
of Parental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 315, 326-27 (1980).
127. Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nev., 691 P.2d 849, 854 (Nev. 1984).
128. Id. at 857.
129. Id. at 854. "[I]f it is decided that the biological parent's behavior does
not violate minimum standards of parental conduct so as to render the parent
unfit, then the analysis ends and termination is denied." Id.
130. Id. at 857.
131. Id. at 854.
132. For a list of statutes and their respective grounds for termination of pa-
rental rights, see supra note 126.
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3. "Best Interest of the Child" Standard
The current trend considers judicial termination of parental rights
using the "best interests of the child" standard.1 33 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority of courts do not sever parental rights solely on the basis of the best
interests of the child.1M Fears arise, that if taken to its logical conclusion,
application of this standard "could lead to a redistribution of the entire
minor population among the worthier members of the community
"135
Courts that apply the "best interests" standard can be divided into two
categories. The first category consists of courts considering only the best
interests of the child in termination proceedings. 136 The second category
includes courts balancing the interests of the child with the interests of the
parent.137 These courts make the best interests of the child a
133. In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 485 (Colo. 1985).
134. For a list of courts that do not terminate parental rights solely on the
basis of the best interests of the child, see infra note 137.
135. Helen Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be
Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L. REv. 347, 355 (1962).
136. Approximately eight courts apply a true best interests standard. See
F.L.L. v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 612 So. 2d 501, 502 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that termination would be in best
interests of child); In reDoe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("[T]he child
is the real party in interest, it is his best interest and corollary rights that come
before anything else, including the interests and rights of biological and adoptive
parents."), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994); In reJ.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1012-13 (La. 1988) (applying best interest
standard); In reAdoption No. 09598, 551 A.2d 143, 146 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)
(interpreting statute to require court determination of child's best interest in deci-
sion to terminate natural parent's rights); In re Samantha D., 740 P.2d 1168, 1170
(N.M. Ct. App. 1987) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest
and the parental rights conflict."); South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs. v. Vander-
horst, 340 S.E.2d 149, 153 (S.C. 1986) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1578 (Law.
Co-op Supp. 1985)); In re E.M., 466 N.W.2d 168, 175 (S.D. 1991) ("The primary
concern of the court is, and must always be, the best interests of the child."); In re
R.W., 577 A.2d 253, 253 (Vt. 1990) ("The ... court is empowered to terminate
parental rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that this is in the
child's best interests.").
137. Twelve courts fall in this category. See In re RH.N., 710 P.2d at 486
("[T]he best interests of the child should be considered... with respect to termi-
nation of the natural parent's rights .... ."); Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. 1992) (considering parents' inability to meet re-
sponsibility as parents and best interests of child); L.B.A. v. HA., 731 S.W.2d 834,
835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that rights of natural mother must be consid-
ered together with best interests of child in determining custody/termination of
parental rights); In re Christina H., 618 A.2d 228, 231 (Me. 1992) (noting that
inquiry as to children's best interest is separate and distinct from inability of par-
ents to protect children or assume responsibility for them); In reJJ.B., 390 N.W.2d
274, 279 (Minn. 1986) (requiring balancing of parent and child interests in deter-
mination of whether to continue or terminate relationship); In re M.B., 386
N.W.2d 877, 883 (Neb. 1986) (applying test of combination of best interests of
child and evidence of fault or neglect of parents to terminate parental rights); In re
Kristopher B., 486 A.2d 277, 282 (N.H. 1984) (terminating parental rights necessi-
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specific factor in the termination decision along with the degree of paren-
tal fault. 3 8
Very few courts decide termination cases solely on the "best interests
of the child" standard. A recent case decided by the Vermont Supreme
tates balancing of parents' fundamental rights against child's best interests); In re
K.S.H., 442 N.W.2d 417, 419 (N.D. 1989) (determining termination of parental
rights involves recognizing parents' fundamental rights to children and consider-
ing best interest of child as one factor); In re Higby, 611 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) (determining whether to terminate parental rights involves examina-
tion of suitability of parent and child's best interests); Ward v. Commonwealth, 408
S.E.2d 921, 923 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that terminating parental rights re-
quires court to examine best interests of child and likelihood that conditions of
parent will be corrected); State ex reL West Va. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cheryl M.,
356 S.E.2d 181, 188 (W. Va. 1987) (reversing lower court termination of parental
rights where mother denied meaningful improvement period to demonstrate abil-
ity to care for child); In reJL, 761 P.2d 985, 989 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that rights of
parent are implicit consideration when determining best interests of child).
Not all of these courts acknowledge the balancing of parent and child inter-
ests. See In re RH.N., 710 P.2d at 486 ("[T~he best interests of the child should be
considered... with respect to termination of the natural parent's rights .... ");
Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (considering parents' inability to meet responsibility as
parents and best interests of child); L.B.A., 731 S.W.2d at 835 (recognizing rights
of natural mother must be considered together with best interests of child in deter-
mining custody/termination of parental rights); Christina H., 618 A.2d at 231
(finding that inquiry as to children's best interest remains separate and distinct
from inability of parents to protect children -or assume responsibility for them);
M.B., 386 N.W.2d at 883 (applying test of combination of best interests of child
and evidence of fault or neglect of parents to terminate parental rights); K.S.H.,
442 N.W.2d at 419 (determining that termination of parental rights involves recog-
nizing parents' fundamental rights to children and considering best interest of
child as one factor); Higby, 611 N.E.2d at 406 (determining that whether to termi-
nate parental rights involves examination of suitability of parent and child's best
interests); Ward, 408 S.E.2d at 923 (stating that terminating parental rights re-
quires court to examine best interests of child and likelihood that conditions of
parent will be corrected); Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d at 188 (reversing lower court termi-
nation of parental rights where mother was denied meaningful improvement pe-
riod to demonstrate ability to care for child); JL, 761 P.2d at 989 (holding that
rights of parent are implicit consideration when determining best interests of
child). Nonetheless, based on their rationales and holdings, it is clear that a bal-
ancing occurs.
For example, Higby involved the termination of the parental rights of a biolog-
ical father. Higby, 611 N.E.2d at 404. In its analysis, the court held that the state
was permitted to terminate the parental rights of the biological father, if it consti-
tuted the best interests of the child. Id. at 405. In determining the best interests of
the child, the court recognized it must consider the eight conditions listed in the
statute. Id. The court maintained, however, that finding that one of the eight
conditions exists was not required to terminate parental rights. Id.
Although the court explicitly rejected a pure "best interests of the child" stan-
dard, it implied courts must balance the best interestsof the child with the suitabil-
ity of the parent. See id. at 406. The court observed that "elements of parental
'unfitness' figure strongly in the 'best interests' test, while elements of 'best inter-
ests of the child' weigh in any consideration of whether a parent is fit to have
custody of his child." Id. (quoting In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1039
(Ohio 1979)).
138. For a list of these courts, see supra note 137.
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Court, however, employed and articulated this standard. The In re R W'13 9
court stated that "[t] he juvenile court is empowered to terminate parental
rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that this is in the
child's best interest."140 This language sounds similar to the language
used by many courts applying the jurisdictional/dispositional standard.' 41
Instead of finding parental fault prior to considering the best interests of
the child, however, these courts rely solely on factors designed to deter-
mine whether termination is in the best interests of the child. 142
139. 577 A.2d 253 (Vt. 1990). In reRW involved the termination of parental
rights by application of the state. Id. at 253. The biological mother of the child
was only sixteen years old at the time of the child's birth. Id. Four months after
birth, the child was placed in foster care. Id. Thereafter, a petition to terminate
the mother's parental rights was filed by the state and granted by the court. Id.
The mother appealed on the grounds that the court did not establish that she
would be unable to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Id.
The court found the child's right to a stable home life, coupled with the uncer-
tainty as to when the mother would be able to resume her parental duties, suffi-
ciently justified termination of her parental rights: Id. at 254.
140. Id. at 253 (citing In reJ.R., 570 A.2d 154, 160-61 (Vt. 1989)).
141. For a list of courts applying the jurisdictional/dispositional standard, see
supra note 119.
142. For a list of courts applying the pure best interests standard, see supra
note 136. Some of the factors relied upon in determining the "best interests of the
child" are statutory. Others have been enumerated in the case law of the state.
The four factors that the In re RW court used to determine whether parental
rights should be terminated are set forth in a Vermont statute. 577 A.2d 253, 253
(Vt. 1990). The statute provides:
§ 5540. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
At the time of the review under section 5531 of this title, a modifica-
tion hearing under section 5532 of this title, or at any time a petition is
filed by the department of social and rehabilitation services for custody of
a minor without limitation as to adoption, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child in accordance with the following:
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his natu-.
ral parents, his foster parents if any, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(2) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(3) The likelihood that the natural parent will be able to resume his
parental duties within a reasonable period of time; and
(4) Whether the natural parent has played and continues to play a
constructive role, including personal contact and demonstrated love and
affection, in the child's welfare.
33 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5540 (1990) (formerly 33 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 667).
Factors enumerated in a Maryland statute include:
(1) the timeliness, nature, and extent of the services offered by the
child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the natural
parent;
(2) any social service agreement between the natural parent and the
child placement agency, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under the agreement;
(3) the child's feelings toward and emotional ties with the child's
natural parents, the child's siblings, and any other individuals who may
significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
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For example, In re Doe14 3 involved a dispute between the biological
parents and the adoptive parents of a child. 1 " In finding for the adoptive
parents, the court held that a "child's best interest is not part of an equa-
tion. It is not to be balanced against any other interest. In adoption cases, like
custody and abuse cases, a child's best interest is and must remain invio-
(5) the effort the natural parent has made to adjust the natural par-
ent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest
of the child to be returned to the natural parent's home, including:
(i) the extent to which the natural parent has maintained regular
contact with the child under a plan to reunite the child with the natural
parent, but the court may not give significant weight to any incidental
visit, communication, or contribution;
(ii) if the natural parent is financially able, the payment of a reason-
able part of the child's substitute physical care and maintenance;
(iii) the maintenance of regular communication by the natural par-
ent with the custodian of the child; and
(iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring about a last-
ing parental adjustment so that the child could be returned to the natural
parent within an ascertainable time, but the court may not consider
whether the maintenance of the parent-child relationship may serve as an
inducement for the natural parent's rehabilitation; and
(6) all services offered to the natural parent before the placement of
the child, whether offered by the agency to which the child is committed
or by other agencies or professionals.
In reAdoption No. 09598, 551 A.2d 143, 147-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (quot-
ing MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-313 (1984)). The Adoption court applied a best
interests test which accounted for parental fault within that analysis. See id. This
outcome contrasts with courts applying the jurisdictional/dispositional standard in
that parental fault in the above test is required to be found in conjunction with the
child's best interests, rather than before the child's best interests as in the jurisdic-
tional/dispositional analysis.
143. 627 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct.,499, and cert. denied sub nom. Doe
v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
144. Id. The biological mother in Doe was not married to the biological fa-
ther. Id. at 649. Four days after the birth of the child, the biological mother
signed a consent form giving her child up for adoption. Id. The biological father,
however, had not signed a consent to give the child up for adoption because he
had been told that the child had died at birth. Id. at 650. In the meantime, the
potential adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt the child. Id.
Approximately two months after the birth of the child, the biological father
was informed that the child had, in fact, been given up for adoption. Id. Shortly
thereafter, the biological father contacted an attorney for the purpose of re-
claiming the child. Id. at 651. The biological father then filed a petition to de-
clare paternity. Id. The court found that the biological father was indeed the
biological father of the child. Id. The potential adoptive parents, however, filed
an amended petition to adopt the child contending that the biological father was
unfit, and therefore, his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Id. The peti-
tion alleged the biological father had not demonstrated a reasonable degree of
interest or responsibility for the welfare of the child in the first thirty days after its
birth. Id.
.The trial court entered an order that the biological father was unfit, and
therefore, his consent to the adoption was not required. Id. On appeal, the Doe
court held that the best interests of the child come before either the interests of
the biological parents or the potential adoptive parents. Id. at 652.
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late and impregnable from all other factors, including the interests of the
parents."145
Courts also apply the best interests standard when addressing the in-
terests of the parent in conjunction with the interests of the child, rather
than considering only the interests of the child. 146 Most courts utilizing
the best interests standard approach termination decisions in this man-
ner.1 47 Egly v. Blackford County Department of Public Welfare' 48 involved a
determination of the correct standard to be applied in terminating paren-
tal rights. 14 9 The court held that before parental rights could be termi-
nated, four factors must be met, one of which consisted of proof that the
termination would be in the best interests of the child.1 50
Courts using either form of the best interests standard recognize that
the biological parent possesses a constitutional right to a child.1 5 ' Never-
theless, courts also recognize "the importance of emotional and psycho-
logical stability to a child's sense of security, happiness and adaptation, as
well as the degree of unanimity among child psychologists regarding the
fundamental significance of permanency to a child's development."1 52 As
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. For a list of courts applying the best interests of the child standard in
conjunction with the parent's interests, see supra note 137.
147. Of the twenty courts that apply the best interests standard, twelve courts
balance the interests of the child and parents rather than considering solely the
interests of the child. For lists of jurisdictions applying each standard, see supra
notes 136-37. '
148. 592 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. 1992).
149. Id. at 1233.
150. Id. at 1234. The court implied that circumstances exist in which the best
interests of the child will outweigh the rights of the parents. For example, the
court stated:
Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows
for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling
to meet their responsibilities as parents. This includes s:tuations not only
where the child is in immediate danger of losing his life, but also where
the child's emotional and physical development are threatened.
Id.
151. See In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (recognizing par-
ents' interest in child), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il.), cert. denied sub nom. Baby Rich-
ard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct.
499 (1994); Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234
(Ind. 1992) (recognizing parental rights are of constitutional dimension); L.B.A. v.
H.A., 731 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) ("It is unquestioned that the best
interest of the child is a major factor to be considered in resolving a case involving
termination of parental rights; but the Supreme Court ... has recognized that the
rights of the natural mother must also be given weight."); In re Kristopher B., 486
A.2d 277, 282 (N.H. 1984) (noting parent has fundamental rights); In re K.S.H.,
442 N.W.2d 417, 419 (N.D. 1989) (recognizing parent's fundamental, natural right
to children is of constitutional level); State ex rel. West Va. Dep't of Human Servs. v.
Cheryl M., 356 S.E.2d 181, 188 (W. Va. 1987) (noting constitutional considerations
mandate preservation of parental rights); In reJL, 761 P.2d 985, 989 (Wyo. 1988)
(noting parental rights are constitutional interests).
152. In reJj.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986); see also In re R.H.N., 710
P.2d 482, 486 (Co. 1985) (recognizing court may consider child's emotional ties
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a result, several of these courts have concluded that when a child has been
out of the custody of his or her biological parents for a long period of
time, often the child's best interests include termination of that relation-
ship.15 3 These courts reason that this course of action enables persons to
whom the child has become emotionally attached to institute adoption
proceedings.1 5 4
A problem with the best interests standard, however, involves its pro-
pensity for vagueness. 155 Critics contend that because it sweeps so
broadly, the "best interest" standard "allow[s) jurists to impose their own
moral preferences in their rulings."15 6 In expressing disdain for the "best
interest of the child" standard, one court stated that "the standard of 'best
interest' of the child provides an open invitation to trample on individual
rights through trendy redefinitions and administrative or judicial
abuse."1 5 7 Occasionally, courts use a parental rights test under the guise
of implementing the best interest standard. 158 This circumstance occurs
when a presumption arises that placement with the biological parents con-
stitutes the best interests of the child.1 5 9
Contrary to the presumption applied by many courts today, the best
interests of a child are not always served by the care of the biological par-
ent, even where that parent is judicially deemed fit, because the child may
to third party in terminating parental rights); In reJ.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1014
(La. 1988) ("There is little disagreement within the profession of child psychology
as to the existence of the phenomenon of the child-psychological parent relation-
ship and its importance to the development of the child."); In re Samantha D., 740
P.2d 1168, 1171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (listing as factor to consider in terminating
parental rights, existence of psychological parent-child relationship between child
and substitute family).
153. See In reJ.J.B., 390 N.W.2d at 280 ("[W]here ... the record demonstrates
a long-term placement characterized by a repeated failure of reasonable efforts to
reunite the family, the trial court should appropriately determine what action most
readily promotes the best interests of the child."); In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122,
131 (N.Y. 1992) (recognizing continued foster care may be appropriate even
though natural parent has not been found unfit in cases where child is so long in
custody of nonparent that psychological trauma is grave enough to threaten de-
struction of child).
154. For a list of these courts, see supra note 151.
155. Curtis, supra note 16, at 149, 154.
156. Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State: American Family Law in His-
torical Perspective, 69 DENy. U. L. Riv. 635, 635 (1992). The amount and complexity
of the potential determinative factors for the best interests of a child, the tendency
of different courts to focus on different factors, and the failure to adopt guidelines
designed to aid in this factual inquiry all led to this conclusion. Alternatives, supra
note 107, at 153-54. Most courts applying the best interests standard, however,
employ various procedures that increase the chances of the biological parent win-
ning the dispute. Id. at 154.
157. In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1376 (Utah 1982).
158. Curtis, supra note 16, at 154; see also Alternatives, supra note 107, at 154
("In effect, the courts seem to have created a continuum from a neutral determi-
nation of the best interest of the child to a disguised application of the parental
right doctrine.").
159. Alternatives, supra note 107, at 154-55.
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suffer severe psychological damage when removed from his or her "psy-
chological" parents.1 60 Rather, the best interests of the child are assured
only by protecting the child's psychological well-being as well as the child's
physical well-being. 161
III. PROPOSED "PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT" STANDARD
A child's psychological relationship with a parent-figure continues to
be much more complex and fragile than appearances may indicate.
16 2
"The psychological parent concept is based on two major principles:
1) normal child development in our society depends on a stable relation-
ship with a caring adult; [and] 2) traumatic disruptions of the parent-child
relationship may cause lasting psychological harm as well as immediate
disturbance."'16 3 A stable, continuous and caring relationship is critical to
a child's development. 164 A child separated from his or her psychological
parent may suffer separation anxiety, trauma, distress, a profound sense of
loss and setbacks in the quality of his or her future emotional attach-
ments. 165 The. long-range effects on a child victimized by a traumatic dis-
160. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 4 (observing that while decisionmakers
elevate child's right to physical well-being over parental rights, they subordinate
child's psychological well-being to parental rights).
161. Id. Childhood development is critical to an individual's personality
structure. Alternatives, supra note 107, at 157. Therefore, if the psychological well-
being of the child is not given primary consideration in determining custody dis-
putes, personality disturbances are more likely to occur. Id. Often, the factors
considered in determining what is in the best interests of a child include the psy-
chological well-being of the child. Id. The traditional approaches to the factors
involved in "best interests of the child" analysis are now being displaced by analysis
of the child's problems and how they might be resolved. James Boskey &John W.
McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1, 4 (1978).
162. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17. The manner in which the child's needs
are met and protection is given ultimately determines the child's response to the
external environment. Id. at 18. For example, if the child's needs are met by a
loving and attentive parent figure, as opposed to an impersonal caretaker, the
child develops an interest in his surroundings rather than remaining involved only
in his or her own body. Id. With this positive parenting, a child develops emo-
tional needs for affection and companionship. Id. Conversely, the child who is
denied affection and companionship may develop mental deficiencies. Id.
163. Curtis, supra note 16, at 172. While disagreements arise as to the exact
nature of causes and effects, the theories' main propositions have consistently
been substantiated. Id. For an analysis of criticisms of the psychological parent
doctrine, see Curtis, supra note 16, at 172-76.
164. Id. at 151. "Numerous studies demonstrate that when a child is deprived
of the opportunity to develop affectionate bonds early in life, his physical, intellec-
tual, and emotional development may be seriously retarded .... " Id. The effects
of this type of deprivation are long-lasting and not easily remedied. Id. at 151-52.
165. GOLDSrEIN, supra note 13, at 33. Disruption in the parent-child relation-
ship produces different consequences depending upon the age of the child. Id. at
32. If the child is under five years old, achievements rooted in interactions with
the parent figure are negatively affected. Id. at 33. Examples of lost achievements
are cleanliness, speech and toilet training. Id. If the child is school-aged, achieve-
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ruption of the psychological parent-child relationship include lack of self-
esteem, trust and ability to care for others.166 These effects may ultimately
lead to behavioral disorders. 16 7 Separations profoundly impact children
because they have not yet developed the adult ability to cope with threats
to their emotional security. 168 Thus, it is not the biological tie that bonds a
child to an adult, but the psychological relationship. 169 The law, there-
fore, should protect this relationship, regardless of whether or not the psy-
chological parent is also the biological parent. 170
The notion that the child is a person whose full individual rights
should be recognized by law is not new.1 71 None of the current standards,
however, adequately consider the parental rights and the child's rights to
both physical and psychological well-being. The "psychological parent"
standard, however, proposes to do just that. Many commentators advocate
application of this standard. 172
ments based on the child's identification with the parents' demands, prohibitions
and social ideals disintegrate. Id. It is, therefore, unlikely that the child will iden-
tify with any set of substitute parents. Id. at 33-34. The child is apt to resent the
parent figures who have disappointed him and make the substitute parents scape-
goats for wrongs of the previous parent figures. Id. at 34.
The following is a psychological evaluation noting the effects of removing a
child from his or her foster home:
Removing [the child] from the [foster parents'] home and replacing
him with his mother.., would constitute an extreme and unconscionable
psychological assault upon him, removing him from the only family he
has ever known and from people with whom he has profound and
healthy emotional attachments and placing him into a home where he is
a total stranger, where a quite different style of life is practiced and where
fairly extensive and continuing family stresses ... are prominent.
D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973).
166. Curtis, supra note 16, at 152. These problems affect not only the individ-
ual, but society as well, because the child will interact with others and may eventu-
ally become a parent. Id.
167. Id. (noting Goldstein's proposal). Children who have suffered multiple
placements at a young age may display disruptive, dissocial, delinquent or even
criminal behavior. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 34.
168. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 12. The inability of children to cope with
such threats stems from their lack of developed intellectual and reasoning capaci-
ties. Id. "Consequently, they respond to any threat to their emotional security with
fantastic anxieties, denial, distortion of reality, reversal or displacement of feel-
ings-reactions which are no help for coping, but rather put them at the mercy of
events." Id.
169. Curtis, supra note 16, at 152.
170. Id. (citingJ. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
59, 99 (1973)).
171. See generally FOSTER, supra note 24 (proposing "Bill of Rights for Chil-
dren"); Rodham, supra note 68 (advocating extension of adult rights to children);
Worsfold, supra note 18 (discussing rationale for extending children full rights of
adults).
172. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 53 (advocating least detrimental avail-
able alternative for safeguarding child's growth and development standard); Alter-
natives, supra note 107, at 157 (proposing psychological best interests test in third
party custody disputes); Boskey & McCue, supra note 161, at 5-13 (discussing nu-
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The crux of the "psychological parent" standard lies in the concept
that successful personality development results not from the biological re-
lationship, but the psychological relationship between adult and child. 173
In implementing this "psychological parent" standard, the court must first
determine which parent is the psychological parent. 174 This assessment
can be achieved by evaluating three basic factors: (1) the continuity of the
relationship between child and adult in terms of proximity and duration;
(2) the love of the adult toward the child; and (3) the affection and trust
of the child toward the adult.175 If the court establishes the existence of a
psychological parent-child relationship, no further inquiry is necessary,
and custody should be awarded to that parent. 176 Accordingly, if the
court establishes that the child retains a psychological relationship with
both the biological parent and a third party, custody should be given to
the biological parent.1 77
One court already defacto employs the psychological parent standard.
In rejM.P.178 centered around a private adoption dispute. After giving
her child up for adoption, the biological mother attempted to regain pa-
rental rights to the child by revoking her consent to the adoption within
the statute's allotted time frame.1 79 The court, however, declared that the
revocation of consent did not prevent the adoption if it remained within
the best interests of the child. °8 0 The court described the best interests of
the child standard as one depending on the child's health, psychology and
welfare. 18 1 In its analysis, the court considered three factors: (1) the fit-
ness of each adult involved; (2) the existence of a psychological relation-
merous standards used in terminating parental rights); Ketcham & Babcock, supra
note 4, at 541 (noting when child has entered into psychological parent-child rela-
tionship with nonparent, rights of natural parent approach limits).
173. Boskey & McCue, supra note 161, at 25.
174. Alternatives, supra note 107, at 160. This is accomplished by inquiring
into the "affection-relationship" between the child and adult. Id. The "affection-
relationship" forms during the first year of a child's life and is the basis for all
future interpersonal relationships. Id.
175. Id. at 162. "Continuity may provide a basis for inferring that an unbro-
ken relationship of warmth and affection has existed over a period of time suffi-
cient to have established a secure relationship with the adult." Id.
176. Id. at 163. This award would allow the child to continue his or her per-
sonality development in a continuous and stable environment, avoiding the
trauma of separation and potential negative future effects. Id. at 163-64. In any
case, the child should not be separated from the psychological parent except in
very rare circumstances. Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 4, at 537-38.
177. The author suggests that the psychological parent standard advocated
does not necessarily favor a third party over the biological parent. Rather, it
merely favors the psychological well-being of the child.
178. 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
179. Id. at 1005. The statutory period within which the natural mother could
revoke her consent to the adoption was thirty days. Id. at 1005 n.1.
180. Id. at 1012.
181. Id. at 1013. The court stated that the basic notion underlying the best
interests of the child standard constitutes "nothing less than the dignity of the
child as an individual human being." Id.
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ship between the child and the adoptive parent; and (3) the relationship
between the natural parent and the child.18 2 The court found it. "should
prefer a psychological parent... over any claimant (including a natural
parent) who, from the child's perspective, is not a psychological par-
ent."'8 3 In discussing the scope of the biological parent's rights, the court
held that a child who lacks an emotional attachment to the biological par-
ent and who perceives the adoptive parent as a psychological parent,
should be placed with the adoptive parents to spare the child mental and
emotional harm, regardless of whether the biological parent is fit.i' 4
The "psychological parent" standard, thus justifies termination of pa-
rental rights only where the biological parent has deprived the child of a
loving and caring relationship enabling normal personality develop-
ment. 18 5 Although the child's right to maintain or establish a parent-child
psychological parent relationship "lacks the venerable legal credentials" of
a biological parent's natural right, courts increasingly recognize this inter-
est.186 Without continued recognition of the psychological parent stan-
dard, litigation over termination of parental rights may evolve into "fitness
contests" subject to the whims of the courts, akin to state reallocation of
children. 187
IV. TESTING THE SOLUTION
In re B.G.C.1 88 involved a dispute between the biological parents of a
baby girl and her potential adoptive parents, the DeBoers.18 9 The child
had been placed in the DeBoer's home shortly after separation from the
biological mother. 190 The DeBoers were the only parents the child had
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1015-16.
185. Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 4, at 536-37.
186. Id. at 537.
187. Curtis, supra note 16, at 155.
188. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
189. Id. at 240-41. A baby daughter was born to Cam Clausen on February 8,
1991. Id. at 240. Ms. Clausen decided to put the child up for adoption. Id. In
relinquishing her rights, however, she named "Scott" as the biological father of the
baby when in fact he was not. Id. at 241. Soon after the hearing terminating the
parental rights of both Ms. Clausen and Scott, Ms. Clausen moved to set aside the
termination on the grounds that the release of parental rights signed by her was
defective. Id. She also daimed that "Daniel Schmidt" was the biological father of
the child. Id. The motion was denied. Id.
190. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993), stay denied, DeBoer v.
DeBoer, 1145 S. Ct. 1 (1993). In re Clausen and In re B.G.C. consist of the same
facts but were decided by different courts, the former decided by the Michigan
Supreme Court and the latter decided by the Iowa Supreme Court. After the Iowa
Supreme Court decision of In re B.G.C., which dismissed the petition for adoption
and remanded to determine the biological father's parental rights, the district
court on remand ordered a termination of the DeBoers' rights as temporary
guardians and custodians of the child. Id. at 653. As a result, the adoptive parents,
the DeBoers, filed a petition in the Washtenaw Circuit Court of Michigan, asking
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ever known. 191 The Iowa Supreme Court determined that the parental
rights of the biological father could not be terminated in the absence of
conduct forfeiting his right to withhold consent to the adoption.' 92 Fur-
ther, the court held it could not consider the best interests of the child
unless and until statutory grounds for termination were found to exist.193
The decision of In re B.G. C. appears to reflect the jurisdictional/dis-
positional standard.194 Alternatively, the Iowa court could have termi-
nated the parental rights of the father based on the analysis set forth in
Quilloin and Lehr.19 5 The use of the psychological parent standard is con-
sistent with this analysis.196 The court, however, simply did not acknowl-
edge or recognize that-its decision clearly disregarded the child's right to
her family'197 ' The DeBoers' were truly the child's psychological parents.
the court to assume jurisdiction over the case under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Id. The petition requested the court to enjoin the en-
forcement of the Iowa custody order in favor of the biological parents or modify it,
giving custody to the DeBoers. Id. After conflicting decisions by the Washtenaw
Circuit Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals, the case was appealed to the
Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at 653-54. The Michigan Supreme Court held that
the Iowa Supreme Court's decision must be enforced. Id. at 667, 668. Further, it
held that the Iowa court was not required to conduct a hearing as to the best
interests of the child. Id.
191. Id. at 652. The child had resided with the DeBoers since shortly after her
birth. Id.
192. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d. at 245.
193. Id. The DeBoers contended that statutory grounds for termination need
not be established because the best interests of the child should decide the issue of
termination in an adoption case. Id. The court stated it could not interfere with
the rights of the natural parents in order to give effect to the best welfare of the
child. Id. Further, the court held it could only consider the best interests of the
child where the natural parents have forfeited their right to withhold consent. Id.
194. For a discussion of the jurisdictional/dispositional standard, see supra
text accompanying notes 119-32.
195. For an analysis of the decisions in Quilloin, see supra text accompanying
notes 86-92. For an analysis of Lehr, see supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
196. For an explanation of the "psychological parent" standard, see supra text
accompanying notes 162-87.
197. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665 (Mich. 1993), stay denied, DeBoer v.
DeBoer, 1145 S. Ct. 1 (1993). The court in Clausen rejected the contention that
children are persons under the Constitution and that the constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests in "family" apply equally to both parents and children. Id.
Instead, the Michigan court held that while children do have a liberty interest in
their family life, their interests are not independent of the biological parents'. Id.
Further, the Michigan court rejected the view that children residing with third
parties are similarly situated as children residing with parents. Id. at 668. Thus,
the Clausen court failed to recognize the explicit language in the Supreme Court
decisions of Lehr and Smith, noting that the liberty interest in "family" is a function
of the intimate relationship between parent and child, and not of biological rela-
tionships. Id. at 665.
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Little doubt exists that the child will suffer the trauma and behavioral
problems that psychoanalysts have predicted.1 98
Another recent custody dispute involved a child that was neither vol-
untarily given up by the biological parents, nor placed with the third party
by a court, nor legally adopted by the third party. The plaintiffs in Twigg v.
Mays' 99 alleged Kimberly Mays was their biological daughter after a switch
at birth with the biological daughter of Robert Mays.200 Approximately 15
years after the birth of both children, the plaintiffs discovered facts uncov-
ering the switch and sought a judicial declaration that Kimberly Mays was
their biological child.20 1 Although blood tests showed, by a 95%
probability, that Kimberly was the biological daughter of the plaintiffs, the
court held that "[t]o declare the plaintiffs to be the natural parents of
Kimberly Mays requires more than evidence that they may be her biologi-
cal parents. '20 2 The court also emphatically stated that Robert Mays is the
psychological parent of Kimberly and her relationship with him consti-
tutes a "family relationship." 203 Finally, the court expounded that any
other determination would be detrimental to Kimberly. 20 4 In refusing to
acknowledge the rights of the biological parents, the court implicitly ap-
plied the psychological parent standard in the Twigg case.
V. CONCLUSION
The law has long recognized that children have "a right to a stable
and healthy environment .... ,"205 Thus, in instances where a child has
developed a psychological parent-child relationship with a third party, the
standard used in terminating parental rights should guarantee this right.
The current confusion in the law results in an inability to ascertain the
correct standard applicable under a particular set of circumstances. Such
198. For a discussion of the possible psychological effects of separating a child
from his or her psychological parent, see supra notes 165-68 and accompanying
text.
199. No. 88-4489-CA-0, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993).
200. Id. at *2. Neither plaintiffs nor defendant, however, knew of the alleged
switch until ten years later. Id. Robert Mays has raised Kimberly since birth. Id.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *4. The court acknowledged that the meaning of "more" is not
clear. Id. Initially, the parties stipulated to a visitation plan, however, Kimberly
stopped the visitation in October of 1990. Id. at *2. Thereafter, the Twiggs at-
tempted to obtain custody of Kimberly, even though Kimberly stated she does not
wish to see the Twiggs. Id. At a final hearing on the matter, the court found it
would be detrimental to Kimberly to enforce visitation with the Twiggs against
Kimberly's will. Id. at *3.
203. Id. at *5.
204. Id. In justification of its holding, the court stated that because of these
proceedings, Kimberly "has not been able to develop as a normal teenager and has
suffered profound assaults upon her mental, and possibly physical, health." Id.
Further, Kimberly views the Twiggs as a constant source of danger to her family.
Id.
205. In re E.M., 466 N.W.2d 168, 175 (S.D. 1991).
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COMMENT
uncertainty causes the child, as well as both the losing and prevailing par-
ties, to suffer emotional damage.
The proposed psychological parent standard favors neither the rights
of the biological parent, nor the third party desiring custody, nor the in-
terests of the state. The sole consideration focuses on the welfare of the
child. Courts have demonstrated that children maintain a fundamental
right to be raised in a healthy and stable environment. Courts have fur-
ther established that children have the right to a parent-child relationship.
Moreover, Supreme Court decisions such as Stanley, Smith, Quilloin and
Lehr suggest that the "familial relationship" does not solely refer to the
blood relation between parent and child.20 6 Thus, the proposed psycho-
logical parent standard constitutes the only standard accounting for the
interests of both the parents and the child. "It is the real tie-the reality
of an ongoing relationship-that is crucial ... and that demands protec-
tion of the state through law."20 7
Thus, the proposed psychological parent standard allows courts faced
with termination questions to avoid the heartless and potentially destruc-
tive decisions resulting from adherence to the archaic notion of children
as property. Further, the psychological parent standard reflects a more
flexible judicial approach which avoids violation of the constitutional right
of parents to raise their children.
Vanessa L. Warzynski
206. For an analysis of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 80-103.
207. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 80.
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